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I. INTRODUCTION

I am extremely grateful to have been invited to respond to Professor
Owen Jones's Dunwody Distinguished Lecture, Proprioception,Non-Law,
and Biolegal History.! The piece is a significant contribution to an
important development in legal scholarship of which Professor Jones has
been a central pioneer: the relationship between evolutionary psychology
and law.2 That innovation is in its infancy, but already its ability to throw
* Alumni Distinguished Professor, College of Law, University of Illinois, and Professor,
Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois. I am grateful to Owen Jones,
Richard McAdams, and Jeff Stake for their comments on an earlier draft. I am very grateful to the
Editors of the FloridaLaw Review for their invitation to comment on Owen's lecture and for their
help in the editorial process.
1. Owen D. Jones, Proprioception,Non-Law andBiolegal History, 53 FLA. L. REv. 831

(2001).
2. Professor Jones comments on the difficulties in characterizing the field of behavioral
biology or evolutionary psychology. Id. at 832. I shall adopt the practice of referring to his
innovation as evolutionary psychology and law.
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bright light on important legal issues is startling,3 and its promise for
altering and enlarging our conceptions of the wellsprings of human
behavior and their implications for the regulatory function of law is
significant.
I shall take as my goal in this response to articulate some concerns that
arose in my reading of the lecture and to comment on several implications
of Professor Jones's innovative view for some live controversies in the
legal academy. I do not take issue with any of the broad themes that Owen
has sounded. Indeed, I am persuaded that his elaboration here and
elsewhere of the connections between behavioral biology and law is one
of the more important and promising projects now ongoing in legal
scholarship. First, however, I shall offer a word of self-introduction and
apology. Then I shall comment directly on some of the novel claims of this
lecture.
II.

BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS AND EVOLUTIONARY
PSYCHOLOGY

I want to take a moment to give a brief summary of a topic on which
Owen does not lay a great deal of stress in his lecture: behavioral law and
economics and its connection to evolutionary psychology. I shall explain
the gist of how behavioral psychology has had an impact on law and
economics and then summarize the connection between evolutionary
psychology and behavioral law and economics. Owen has been the leader
in drawing this connection.4
A. Rational Choice Theory and BehavioralLaw andEconomics
I write from the perspective of one steeped in and devoted to the
economic analysis of law but with a difference that is, I think, pertinent to
the matters at the heart of Owen's Dunwody Lecture. While I have done
my share of arguing in favor of a rational-choice-based conception of
3. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, The Tragi-Comedy of the Commons: EvolutionaryBiology,
Economics, and EnvironmentalLaw, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 17 (2001); E. Donald Elliott, Law and
Biology: The New Synthesis?, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 595 (1997); Owen D. Jones, Law and the
Biology of Rape: Reflections on Transitions, 11 HASTINGS WOMEN's L.J. 151 (2000); Owen D.
Jones, Sex, Culture,andtheBiologyofRape: TowardExplanationandPrevention,87 CAL. L. REV.
827 (1999); Owen D. Jones, Introductionto the Symposium on Biology andSexualAggression, 39
JuRimTcs J. 113 (1999); Owen D. Jones, Law and Biology: Toward an IntegratedModel of
HumanBehavior,8 J.CONTEMP. LEGAL IsSUES 167 (1997); Owen D. Jones, EvolutionaryAnalysis
in Law: An Introductionand Application to ChildAbuse, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1117 (1997); Jeffrey
Evans Stake, Are We Buyers orHosts? A Memetic Approach to the FirstAmendment, 52 ALA. L.
REV. 1213 (2001); Jeffrey Evans Stake, Darwin, Donations, and the Illusion of Dead Hand
Control,64 TuL. L. REv. 705 (1990).
4. See Owen D. Jones, Time-ShifedRationalityandtheLaw ofLaw's Leverage, 95 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1141 (2001).
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human behavior, I have in the recent past come to believe that rational
choice theory, which has informed mainstream microeconomics for fifty
or more years and all of law and economics for the past twenty years,
needs to be tempered (not replaced) by a due regard for the predictable and
systematic shortcomings in human cognitive and ratiocinative powers.'
Russell Korobkin and I (as well as others)6 have characterized this richer
account of human decisionmaking and its implications for law as "law and
behavioral science."7 None of us is in a position yet to offer a
comprehensive account of this melding of predictable human fallibility
and rationality, but we can at least indicate some reasons for taking time
to search for an amended theory of human decisionmaking that goes
beyond rational choice theory.
The central distinguishing contention of this emerging emendation of
rational choice theory is that human beings are imperfectly rational. In the

5. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law andBehavioralSeience: Removing the
RationalityAssumptionfrom Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000).
6. See, e.g., BEHAvioRAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Robert J.
Frank & Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position,68 U. CHI. L. REV. 323
(2001); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the JudicialMind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2000); Samuel
Issacharoff, Can There Be a BehavioralLaw and Economics?, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1729 (1998);
Russell B. Korobkin, BehavioralAnalysisandLegalForm:Rules vs. StandardsRevisited, 79 OR.
L. REv. 23 (2000); Russell B. Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care "PatientProtection"
Laws: Incomplete Contracts,Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure,85 CORNELL L. REv. 1
(1999); Russell B. Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and ContractDefault Rules, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 608 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, andSettlement:
A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 77 TEx. L. REv. 76 (1997); Timur Kuran & Cass R.
Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REv. 683 (1999); Donald C.
Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended
Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEo. L.J. 797 (2001) [hereinafter
Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards]; Donald C. Langevoort, Half-Truths:
ProtectingMistaken Inferences by Investors and Others, 52 STAN. L. REV. 87 (1999); Donald C.
Langevoort, Behavioral Theories ofJudgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998); Donald C. Langevoort, Organizedllusions:A BehavioralTheory of
Why CorporationsMisleadStock MarketInvestors (And Cause OtherSocial Harms), 146 U. PA.
L. REv. 101 (1997) [hereinafter Langevoort, OrganizedIllusions];Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics
and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61 (2000); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski & Forest Jorden, Remedies and the Psychologyof Ownership,51 VAND. L. REV. 1541
(1998); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A PositivePsychologicalTheory ofJudginginHindsight, 65 U. CI.
L. REV. 571 (1998); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology ofLitigation, 70 S.
CAL. L. REV. 113 (1996); David Schkade et al., DeliberatingAboutDollars: The Severity Shift, 100
COLUIM. L. REv. 1139 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behaviorandthe Law ofWork, 87 VA. L.
REv. 205 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, DeliberativeTrouble? Why GroupsGo to Extremes, 110 YALE
L.J. 71 (2000) [hereinafter Sunstein, DeliberativeTrouble?];Cass R. Sunstein, Economics & Real
People, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 397 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Cognitionand Cost-BenefitAnalysis,29
J. LEGAL STUD. 1059 (2000).
7. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 5, at 1057.
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pursuit of their ends people make systematic, predictable mistakes that the
law can take into account in its attempts to regulate human behavior
Consider this example: there is ample experimental evidence to suggest
that people are systematically overly-optimistic about the likelihood of
good things happening to them in the future, regardless of what experience
and statistical information should teach them.' For example, the vast
majority of couples who are about to marry predict that they will not
divorce, notwithstanding the widely known fact that approximately fifty
percent of all marriages end in divorce."
If this over-optimism is a common human failing, then there are
profound implications for law (and for the economic analysis of law).
Suppose, for instance, that we seek to deter crime by raising the expected
cost of crime." According to the standard model, as informed by rational
choice theory, we deter crime in this manner because we assume that
criminals are rationally self-interested and that they compare the expected
costs and expected benefits in deciding whether to commit a crime. If the
expected costs exceed the expected benefits, they do not commit the crime;
however, if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs, they commit
the crime. This powerful theory suggests that society can deter crime by
manipulating the expected costs and benefits of criminal (and legitimate)
behavior, for example, by raising the probability of detection, arrest, and
conviction; by increasing the penal sanction; and by making legitimate
work more widely available and more rewarding. This theory has been
used to inform criminal justice policy for about twenty years, and it may
be the case-there is conflicting evidence on this point-that the theory is
responsible for the remarkable drop in crime in the United States since
1994.12
8. I have argued elsewhere that the distinguishing aspect of rational choice theory is that
decisionmakers who are said to be operating according to its assumptions do not make mistakes.
See id. at 1061-62. More accurately, in rational choice theory decisionmakers only make mistakes
when they are deliberately misinformed, e.g. through fraud or strong informational asymmetries
such as those in the prisoner's dilemma, or in the sense that they take actions that, while
individually optimal, are socially suboptimal. This is the case with monopoly, public goods, and
external costs and benefits. I confess to some unease about calling these behaviors "mistakes."
More precisely, they are behavioral regularities that are at odds with the predictions of rational
choice theory.
9. Id. at 1091.
10. Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average:
Perceptionsand Expectations of Divorce at the Time ofMarriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439,
443 (1993).
11. We can do this by heightening the probability of detection, arrest, and conviction of a
crime and by raising the level of the criminal sanction. We can also do this by raising the
opportunity cost of crime, i.e., by making gainful employment more rewarding. See ROBERT D.
COOTER & THOMAS S. ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMIcs 427-88 (3d ed. 1999), elaborating on Gary
Becker's economic theory of crime and punishment
12. There is a vast literature on this important issue. For the basic statistics on the decline in
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But what if those whose criminal behavior we seek to deter are, like
most human beings, overly-optimistic? In that case, they may
systematically overestimate the expected benefits or underestimate the
expected costs of crime. They may, for instance, assume that they are less
likely to be caught than is in fact the case; or, if caught, they may
underestimate the likelihood of being convicted; or, if convicted, they may
believe that they will escape a severe sentence or heavy fine. They will be,
in short, overly optimistic about their chances of getting away with the
crime, and that may induce more crime than anticipated under rational
choice theory.
One implication may be that, in order to achieve a given level of
deterrence, the authorities would have to make punishment harsher and
more certain than would be the case if potential criminals were perfect,
rational calculators. For example, the existence of significant overoptimism among potential criminals may be the strongest argument in
favor of mandatory minimum sentencing laws.
But life is never simple. While over-optimism may appear to make one
aspect of the study of crime more straightforward, at the same time it
makes another aspect less straightforward. For if potential criminals are
systematically overly optimistic, then how are we to explain variations in
the amount of crime over time? The usual factors used to explain variation
may not be relevant. One can imagine alternative explanations that have
a regard for the systematic over-optimism of potential criminals. As an
illustration, it may be the case that because young males account for such
a large fraction of all the crime committed and because young males may
tend to be more optimistic about succeeding at crime than are other groups
in society,13 variations in the amount of crime may be attributable to
changes in the percentage of young men relative to other groups in the
population. Or it might be the case that the degree of over-optimism
among potential criminals varies in ways that we do not yet discern. For
example, over-optimism may vary with the business cycle, either directly
or inversely (we do not know which, if either). Or it might be the case that
the appropriate criminal sanctions, in light of excessive optimism, vary
over time in ways that we do not perceive, so that the level of deterrence
varies in ways unanticipated by the criminal justice system authorities.

crimes against property and other persons and an introduction to some of the theories that seek to
explain the decline in crime, see the website companion to LAW AND ECONOMICS, at
http://www.cooter-ulen.com/crime.htm. The most controversial and interesting of those theories
is one that links reductions in crime to the legalization of abortion. See John J. Donohue & Steven
D. Levitt, The Impact ofLegalizedAbortion on Crime, 116 Q. J. EcoN. 379 (2001).
13. There may be other characteristics of young males--such as a relatively low degree of
risk aversion-that make their relative proportion in the population a significant factor in
explaining variations in the amount and kind of crime.
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I want to reiterate my point that behavioral law and economics does not
propose to scrap rational choice theory entirely. Rather, it seeks to amend
it to take due account of systematic human fallibilities. It does not make
the indefensible claims that human beings are never rational, or that they
are always irrational. What it hopes to do is to give an account of human
decisionmaking that is empirically grounded, that recognizes statistical
regularities in human behavior, but that also finds nuances in that behavior
that arise from age, gender, education, circumstance, and other relevant
factors.
B. EvolutionaryPsychology and BehavioralLaw and Economics
There is a direct and important connection between behavioral law and
economics and Owen's project of bringing evolutionary psychology to the
law. The connection arises from the fact that evolutionary psychology
offers the best explanation as to why human beings are imperfectly
rational decisionmakers. Specifically, evolutionary psychology suggests
that the human brain and mind and, therefore, human psychology, are the
products of the process of natural selection. That is, the human mind, like
other aspects of the human animal, evolved through natural selection in
particular circumstances over very long time periods. If, to illustrate this
point, humans are psychologically inclined to cooperate with other humans
when they observe others behaving cooperatively and to retaliate against
those whom they perceive not to be cooperating, regardless ofthe presence
or absence of material incentives to cooperate, 4 then we are probably
observing behavior that has been found to be so useful to humans living
in groups that it has become hardwired into our brains.
Because human affairs have moved much more quickly than has human
evolution, we are now inhabiting environments that are vastly different
from those in which our ancestors' struggle for existence shaped individual
and societal characteristics. As a result, there is, in some instances, a
mismatch between the brain's cognitive and ratiocinative abilities and the
tasks that we currently face. For example, the predisposition toward
optimism noted above may have served humans well in circumstances in
which there was a high return to soldiering on after difficult-to-catch prey
or after a traumatic natural disaster, like the plague, wiped out a large
portion of one's family and friends. But it is not so clear that a
predisposition to optimism serves one so well today, as against the ability
to assess one's options in a clear-eyed manner." As a society, we might
14. See Dan M. Kahan, Trust, CollectiveAction, andLaw, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333,334 (2001).

15. But perhaps excessive optimism is just as important today as it was in the environment
of evolutionary adaptation. One might argue that those with a predisposition to believe that they
will fare well in the future are, even today, more likely to succeed at modem tasks than those who
do not have that optimism. If so, natural selection may continue to select for this excessively
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wish that potential criminals would make astute calculations, not starryeyed ones, about their chances to succeed in crime. But if excessive
optimism is a trait for which most of us are hard wired, then it is not really
feasible for us to turn that optimism on and off; we are over-optimistic tout
court, not selectively.
Noticing that fact-that we may be hardwired to be excessively
optimistic about almost everything, not just about some things-creates
special problems for law and other methods of social regulation. Optimism
about some things may be a good thing and, therefore, ought to be
encouraged or, at the least, not discouraged. Thinking that one will
succeed in one's employment may be an example. Optimism about other
things may be a bad thing and, therefore, ought to be discouraged, as might
be the case with excessive risk-taking behavior. But the law (and other
forms of social regulation) may not be fine-grained enough to distinguish
among the optimisms to be encouraged and those to be discouraged. Or,
even if we could recognize the differences among the desirable and
undesirable optimisms, we may not have the tools to regulate them
appropriately.
In previous work, Owen has elaborated to great effect on the mismatch
hypothesis; namely, that the cognitive abilities with which the process of
natural selection has equipped us may have served humans well in ancient
environments, but do not necessarily do so today.16 He has made a second
important point about this matter that should also help behavioral law and
economics make advances: that the extent to which natural selection has
hardwired some human behaviors will dictate, in large part, how difficult
it will be for regulatory processes to induce non-instinctual behavior.
Considerjealousy. Human beings are apparently hardwired to be jealous
of their sexual mates."3 That is, the decision to be jealous or not is
apparently beyond our rational control; it is an emotion that has evolved
because it generally serves us well, precisely because it is beyond our
rational control.' But jealousy can tragically lead to violence, and society
is ill-served by outbreaks of violence. So there is a general social interest
in limiting violence, specifically the violence that arises from sexual
jealousy. In seeking to control jealousy-induced violence, the law must
recognize that it is a powerful emotion, that it has its origins in natural
selection, and that, because this emotion is well beyond rational control,
regulating the adverse consequences of jealousy is going to require

optimistic attitude.
16. See generally Jones, supra note 4, at 837.
17. See generally DAVID M. Buss, THE DANGEROUS PASSION: WHY JEALOUSY IS AS
NECESSARY AS LOVE AND SEX (2000).
18. Id. at 5-6.
19. See id. at 8.
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extraordinary pressures or sanctions in order to counteract the hardwiring
that disposes humans toward jealousy.
These two points-that we human beings may have the systematic
cognitive imperfections on which behavioral law and economics lays such
stress because those behaviors or imperfections have served humans well
in their evolutionary past but are inapt today and that, therefore, trying to
induce human beings to behave in ways contrary to those dictated by their
evolution-induced psychology may require special pressures-could
hardly be more important.
C. The Limitationsof EvolutionaryPsychology in Legal Explanations
Owen has established the mismatch hypothesis and its implications.20
He does not claim that the recognition of the evolutionary endowment of
human psychology explaifis everything about the law, merely that it is an
important and heretofore overlooked factor in explaining how the law
should regulate human behavior.2 In this section I want to suggest what
tools may be of most use in addressing the legal issues raised by Owen's
insights.
I begin with the obvious point-one to which Owen would readily
assent: that we are at a very early stage in our understanding of the sources
of human behavior. Evolutionary psychology and behavioral law and
economics are new disciplines, and there is, obviously, much scholarship
to be done in those fields.' Conclusions in those fields that we now take
to be settled or nearly settled could change dramatically. Despite the strong
sense that there is much of value to the law that will come from these
fields, we must be cautious and hold our conclusions contingently.
Let me raise two particular cautions about the future of evolutionary
psychology in legal analysis: one that I shall return to in the next section
and another that is no more than an educated guess about the future
direction of legal scholarship.
The first caution comes from my uncertainty about how to integrate
evolutionary forces into the multiple sources of effect on human behavior.
Evolution is one among many salient factors that determine human
behavior. There is also a genetic influence, one that comes from the
particular genes in one's family. There are cultural and environmental
20. See Jones, supra note 4.
21. Jones, supra note 1, at 833; see also the applications cited in note 3, supra.
22. As anecdotal evidence of these contentions, I offer the fact that there is no course on
evolutionary psychology in any department of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,
despite the fact (or because of the fact) that the Departments of Psychology and of Biology and
other relevant departments are very highly regarded. There are very, very few courses in U.S. law
schools on behavioral law and economics, although the material is now making its way into the
standard law and economics course. See, e.g., COoTER & ULEN, supra note 11 (including Chapter
12, which treats briefly how behavioral law and economics might relate to criminal behavior).
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forces.23 There are changing tastes and preferences and fads and fancies.
There are considerations of rational self-interest, as rational choice theory
has always maintained. There are political considerations. There are group
dynamics.24 There are religious and spiritual motivations. We may
perceive individual strands of this complex fabric of motivations, but we
do not yet have a clear sense of the entire cloth. I am not, of course, saying
that human behavior is simply too complicated to be studied
systematically. Rather, I am saying that in light of these multiple
determinants of human behavior and the early stage of our understanding
of how these multiple determinants interact, we must derive our
conclusions slowly and contingently.
The second caution has to do with the division of labor among various
important tools for performing legal analysis. Although I believe that
evolutionary psychology will grow in importance in the analysis of human
behavior and of law, its impact will come only to the extent that it works
in partnership with other important emerging legal-scholarship trends. My
sense is that the division of justifications for legal regulations of human
behavior among the various tools of which we now are aware is this:
evolutionary psychology can identify the hard- and softwired elements of
human behavior and tell us how strong the legal lever must be applied to
those hardwirings in order to achieve socially desirable behavioral
outcomes; in the event of softwired behaviors and in defining the ultimate
behaviors that we desire, other disciplinary tools must be brought to bear.
Specifically, I believe that the behavioral economic analysis of law,
political philosophy, and pragmatic policy considerations-working with
the information provided by evolutionary psychology-are the three most
important guides to how law should address the legal issues raised by
evolutionary psychology.
The behavioral economic analysis of law can help to identify problems
of societal organization and fnctioning that can and cannot be solved by
individual bargaining behavior. It can also provide standard categories of
analysis for these problems, show what shortcomings of rationality are
most likely to impede the proposed solutions, and fashion solutions for
those categorical problems. For example, there are problems of collective
action, the internalization of external costs and benefits, and the optimal
provision of public goods. These are categories of interaction that must
have existed from the beginning of human history. However, in small
group settings they were probably dealt with by means of social
conventions and norms. As the size of human aggregations increased, the
23. I recognize that these may not be independent sources ofbehavior, but are co-determined
by evolutionary processes.
24. For more thorough analyses of group dynamics, see Langevoort, The HumanNature of
Corporate Boards, supra note 6; Langevoort, Organized Illusions, supra note 6; Sunstein,
DeliberativeTrouble, supra note 6.
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organizing ability of social conventions and norms proved limited, and
there was a need for alternative methods of governance-methods that
went far beyond the informal or slow evolutionary development of social
norms.
Political philosophy can provide guidance with two matters:
governance generally and in solving distributional or equity issues that lie
outside the domain of economic analysis. These matters, like those
suggested by economic analysis, may have presented problems for human
beings in the environment of evolutionary adaptation, but those problems
were surely less vexing than they have become in modem, urban nationstates. Primitive tribes, for instance, probably did not experiment among
alternative forms of governance. They used what was handed down to
them and what was consistent with their circumstances. Nor is it likely that
primitive tribes discussed matters of the just distribution of resources. For
one, there was probably very little in the way of a disposable surplus in
societies living on the edge of starvation and extinction. For another, most
of the members of the tribe were probably related by birth and marriage so
that matters of distribution shaded very quickly into matters of helping
in.25

Finally, pragmatic policy considerations will inform how societies
implement legal and other regulatory methods to effectuate solutions to
efficiency, governance, and distributional matters. Only a subset of the
possible solutions to any policy issue will be feasible-if for no other
reason than that those who would lose from a policy change will object,
while those who benefit will champion the change.26 There is an art and a
skill to being able to discern which of the possible solutions is both the
most likely to work and the one that can be enacted, and what may be
safely delegated to regulation by informal social norms.27
25. See 1 W.D. HAMILTON, NARROW ROADS OF GENEI LAND 338 (1996).
26. There is no better theoretical guide to the practical problems of policy change than
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS
(rev. ed. 1971). See also DEREK BOK, THE TROUBLE WITH GOVERNMENT (2001).
27. The recent debates over human cloning and stem-cell research might serve to illustrate
this point. In 1997, President Clinton signed an Executive Order prohibiting federal funding of
cloning research and commissioned the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (the
Commission) to recommend a course of action. Christine Willgoos, FDA Regulation:An Answer
to the Questions ofHuman Cloning and Germline Gene Therapy, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 101, 114
(2001). The Commission recommended formal legislation to ban human cloning. REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BIOETHICS COMMISSION (1997), available at
http://bioethics.gov/pubs/cloning.pdf. Forasummary ofrecent unsuccessful federal legislation, see
Willgoos, supra,at 115-17. The current Congress seems closer to success. On July 31, 2001 the
House of Representatives passed the Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001. H.R. 2505, 107th
Cong. (2001).
For coverage of President George W. Bush's recent announcement regarding stem-cell
research, see Katharine Q. Seelye, The President's Decisions: The Overview; Bush Gives His
Backingfor Limited Research on Existing Stem Cells, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2001, at Al.
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III. NON-LAW
One of the central contentions of Owen's Article is that we can learn
something important about the core values of the law by looking at the
things that are not law.2" And he proposes that frequently, but not
exclusively, the things that are non-law are pointless, needless, toothless,
and useless.29 The purpose of this exercise is the suggestion that, over
time, and perhaps through evolutionary processes, the matters that are left
as law have the opposite characteristics-that is, the contents of the law
have a point, are necessary, have some bite, and serve a vital purpose.
Although Owen recognizes that this filter is not perfect, and although I
join him in thinking that performing this filtering is a very valuable
exercise, I also want to emphasize a reason that the filter may mislead us.
It is absolutely vital, I believe, for those who are analyzing law to
recognize that law, in its various forms, is only one among several
methods that societies use to order themselves. Standing somewhere
between the individual and the panoply of legal authorities are family,
tribe, region, and nation-state, all of which exercise some influence on
individual and group behavior. In addition, there are the numerous formal
and informal non-governmental civic organizations that command loyalty
and exact degrees of behavioral obedience from us all. Included among
these civic organizations are tribes, social clubs, choirs, on-line chat
groups, workplace organizations, labor unions, sports team fan clubs,
religious organizations, and the like.3" Membership in these intermediate
organizations is fluid, and individuals can belong to a host ofthese groups.
As a result, there is a web of overlapping loyalties to these groups that
provide multiple connections among individuals and families, and that
therefore serve to bind a society together."
Similarly, unwritten social norms (established, disseminated, and
enforced through the range ofgroups noted in the previous paragraph) play
an important role in social cohesion.32 As Robert Ellickson and others have
28. Jones, supra note 1, at 845-47.
29. Id. at 851-53.
30. Robert Putnam has famously characterized these intermediate organizations as providing
"social capital." In two important recent works he has stressed how significant these intermediate
civic organizations can be in accounting for social cohesion and the success of governmental
organizations, ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIL TRADITIONS IN MODERN

ITALY 163-85 (1993) (arguing that those Italian hill towns with choral societies or their like had
local governments that worked well as aresult of the presence of the choral societies), and how the
absence of social capital can lead to societal problems, see ROBERTD. PUTMAN, BOWLING ALONE
287-95 (2000).
31. When human beings lived in much smaller groups, perhaps in the environment of
evolutionary adaptation, the need for social capital as a method of cohesion was surely less than

it has become in modem urban society.
32. As is well known, law and economics has turned a great deal of attention lately to the
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shown, many people pay far closer attention to the norms ofneighborliness
in choosing their behavior than they do to the relevant laws. Moreover,
Ellickson and Lisa Bernstein, among others, have suggested that people
resort to law only when the relationships that underlie social norms have
irretrievably broken down. 3 Law is, in their view, a method of solving an
endgame problem, not a method of preserving a relationship. The mirrorimage of that observation is that compliance with social norms is the
default method of human interaction.
These thoughts suggest that the connection between law and non-law
is more complex than Owen implies. Rather than non-law containing
pointless, useless, toothless, and needless categories, nonlaw-contemplated to include social norms and intermediate civic
organizations---can constitute extremely important elements of society.
Moreover, there is, no doubt, a complicated and important connection
among law, social norms, intermediate civic organizations, and other
social structures in establishing a well-functioning human society. What
we do not yet understand is the appropriate division of responsibility and
of competency among these forms of social organization. For instance, we
do not know what issues to leave to social norms and what to reserve for
formal legal structures. Nor do we fully understand when some of these
methods work as complements and when they work as substitutes, which
are in tension against one another and which serve to support one another.
And it is not unlikely that the degree of complementarity and
substitutability among law and other methods of social ordering has varied
over the course of human history in systematic ways and may vary across
human cultures, with some placing greater reliance on, say, the family and
kin-group and others putting greater reliance on impersonal legal controls.
In line with Owen's general themes in the Dunwody Lecture, I wonder
the extent to which a study of the human evolutionary past might shed
light on this matter of dividing responsibility among law, social norms,
family, government, intermediate civic organizations, and the like. For
instance, we may be constructed so as to respond far more effectively to
small-group governance situations than to large, impersonal ones.34 As a
result, a wise governance structure would seek to lay greater stress on
issue of the relationship between law and social norms. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER
WrrHoLtrLAw: HOWNEGHBORS SErLEDISPUTES 123-36(1991); ERICPOSNER,LAWAND SOCIAL
NoRMs (2000); see also Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law, Norms, and
Economic Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 625 (2001) (book review); Richard H. McAdams, The
Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997).
33. ELLICKSON, supra note 32, at 123-36; Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant
Court: Rethinking the Code's Searchfor Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765,
1796-1802 (1996); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the DiamondIndustry, 211. LEGAL STUD. 115, 132-45 (1992).
34. See MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: How LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG
DIFFERENCE (2000).
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controlling human populations by means of small-group structures than by
remote and impersonal rules and regulations. This is in line with my
observation above that human history exhibits a trend away from smallgroup living to residence in increasingly large aggregations. Perhaps a
better way of putting this is to say that one of the challenges of modem
society is to figure out how human beings, who are comfortable with and
designed for prospering in small-group settings, are to be governed when
they choose to live together in large numbers, such as those of modem
metropolises.
IV. BIOLEGAL HISTORY AND COMPARATIVE LAW

Let us assume that there is an important connection between
evolutionary processes and the human brain and mind. And because the
brain and mind crucially determine human behavior, there is, therefore, a
connection between evolution and human behavior. And finally, because
law seeks to regulate human behavior, there is a connection between
evolution and law. One of the significant new suggestions of the Dunwody
Distinguished Lecture is that we might be able to detect the direct
connection between evolution and law by looking at what Owen calls
"biolegal history."
I have implicitly seconded this suggestion in the previous section of
this Article in my stressing the importance of discovering both how law
fits with the many other devices for achieving social cohesion and how
those relationships may have changed over time. Nonetheless, I am
skeptical that we shall be able to learn much from biolegal history. In
brief, the argument is that there are too many paths of influence among
brain, mind, and law to be hopeful of statistically isolating primary causal
relationships. However, in the second section below, I suggest comparative
law as an alternative source of possible testable hypotheses about the
biolegal history hypothesis.
A. The ConnectionsAmong Brain,Mind, Environment, andBehavior
Let me assume that the brain and the mind are closely related but
distinct items. This assumption allows me to deal withhistoric possibilities
in which the brain changed but the mind did not, or they both changed
together, or the brain remained the same but the mind changed. Those who
relate evolutionary psychology and human behavior typically are talking
about the connection between the mind and behavior in the following way:
first, the environment changes, creating a change in the return to certain
behaviors, and then, those changed behaviors may, through natural
selection, become hardwired as a part of our brains and minds.
I wonder if the connection among brain, mind, environment, and
behavior might not be more complex than this. In fact, let me consider four
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possibilities about the connections that will serve to illustrate, I hope, how
very difficult it may be, particularly given the paucity of the historical
record, to disentangle the causes from the consequences. In each instance
there will be a change in behavior; what will be difficult to discern is what
caused that change in behavior.
One possibility is that the initiating change was a change in brain
structure and ability, with changes in the human mind and psychology
coming, if at all, afterward. For instance, suppose that through chance
variation, the storage capacity of the human brain increased. We might
predict a change in human behavior simply because the increased storage
capacity of the average human brain would allow people to remember
more things, such as the (oral) history of their group or the location of
favorable hunting grounds. Or the increased capacity might have led to
greater reasoning power, with the result that those with the larger brains
could out-think and, therefore, defeat their rivals for hunting territory. The
initiating change here was one in brain capacity with a subsequent change
in behavior. All of this is possible without there being a change in mind or
psychology.
Now imagine a second possibility-one in which there is an initial
change in brain structure or ability with a consequent change in mind and
psychology, which in turn causes a change in behavior. For instance,
suppose that, through chance variation, the ability of the human brain to
process visual images from a great distance increased. That change in the
structure or ability of the brain might have increased the ability of the
group with this heightened visual acuity to track and kill game. And that
may have altered the optimal size of a tribe's hunting territory. This firstorder change might then have altered the psychology of human tribes in
deciding what territories they might appropriately control.
A third possibility is that the brain's structure or its abilities remained
unchanged, but that the mind or psychology was altered by changed
circumstances, resulting in changed behavior. For instance, suppose that
some calamity in the environment of evolutionary adaptation led to the
untimely death of a significant fraction of females of a group. There might
have been an increased competition among males for the now-reduced
number of females, and, as a consequence, there may have been an
increase in the amount of anger and jealousy affecting the group. If the
results of those increased emotions was not good and if the group
recognized that anger and jealousy were proving destructive to the group's
ability to prosper, then the psychology and then the behavior of the group
might have altered so as to adapt to the new circumstances in a less
destructive manner. For example, the group may have shifted to believing
that polyandry was a good thing and have altered its customs or formal
rules so as to allow women to have multiple husbands simultaneously.
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Finally, some behavioral changes may have occurred without any
change in brain or mind. Perhaps the environment of a group changed in
such a manner as to suggest to members of the group that their behavior
ought to change to take advantage of the new circumstances. Or perhaps
the environment did not change either; perhaps some enterprising person,
whom Cass Sunstein might characterize as a "norm entrepreneur," simply
thought of a new way of doing things and demonstrated convincingly to
her colleagues that the behavioral change made sense.
All four of these changes could have occurred at various times in
human history, and any of them could have had important consequences
for the organization of human social life, including law. I am very
skeptical that there is much in the archeological and historical record that
will allow us to differentiate among these very different sources of
behavioral (and related legal) change in human societies. Even ifwe were
to find records of changes in behavior in primitive groups, we might not
be able to piece together evidence to tell us whether this behavioral change
was due to a change in the group's brain sizes, minds, environment, or
something else. Trying to disentangle these various changes in human
evolutionary history is a formidable task, to say the least.
B. ComparativeLaw and BiolegalHistory
I want to conclude these remarks by drawing out two implications of
Owen's concern for biolegal history for the study of comparative law.
Recall that Owen writes, "[A] fair extrapolation from existing scholarship
on contemporary legal systems suggests that the body of law a culture
displays is typically considered to reflect a complex amalgam of culturespecific norms, culture-specific religions, culture-specific morals, culturespecific politics, and general economic efficiencies. 35
I could not agree more with this characterization of comparative law.
There is, of course, a functionalist approach to that subject; an approach
that holds that, whatever the differences in culture, every legal system is
trying to solve the same basic problems or has the same functional goal
(such as establishing an orderly method of defining interests in property)
and should, therefore, have functional equivalents-no matter how
different-seeming the comparable areas of law may be.
An implication of the evolutionary psychology view of human behavior
is that there ought to be some regularities in human behavior across
cultural boundaries because we all stem from roughly the same
environment of evolutionary adaptation. Human beings, regardless of their
culture, share, among other things, the same reasoning powers, the same
sex drive, and the emotions of anger, jealousy, and the like. Every society
must somehow balance the need for social harmony against the pressures
35. Jones, supranote 1, at 847.
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that the sex drive and some of the emotions create for disharmony. And
perhaps one promising line of inquiry in comparative law is to investigate
how different legal systems (and other methods ofsocial control) deal with
the issues created by our common evolutionary psychology.
Second, I wonder if comparative law could provide the body of data
that Owen hoped that biolegal history would provide (and of which I was
so skeptical in the previous section). Different legal systems have arisen
and evolved with different mixtures of law, social convention and norms,
family structures, intermediate civic organizations, and so on. If we
assume, as seems reasonable as a first approximation, that the human
beings in these different (recent) legal systems have much the same
evolutionary psychology, then perhaps we can isolate some significant
environmental factors that help to determine the structure and relative
importance of law. Alternatively, if one could establish that there is a
different evolutionary psychology in different cultures, then by studying
the similarities and differences in the legal systems and other methods of
social ordering among those cultures, one might greatly advance the cause
of showing the relationship among evolution, law, and human behavior.
V. CONCLUSION

As I hope is evident, I am a great fan of Owen's general approach and
of the specific issues raised in this lecture. He has fully persuaded me that
the law must take account of the fact that human beings are greatly
influenced by the processes of natural selection and that some of our
behavior is deeply hardwired by evolution. The ability of law, social
norms, and other methods of control to achieve social order by influencing
these deeply ingrained behaviors may be limited.
The powers of human beings to think, to create, to love, and to
speculate are wondrous. And yet it would be a mistake for us to think that
these magnificent powers enable us to become anything that we desire to
be or to live in any manner we desire or to order our collective affairs
according to more logically coherent theories. We are importantly and
vitally determined not just by our power to reason and communicate, but
also by the fact that we have an evolutionary past that is still with us. Our
reasoning ability, profound though it be, must not lose sight of that
ineluctable fact.
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